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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
LIABILITY FOR REMOVAL OF TIMBER,
MINERALS, AND DIRT
Ownership of immovable property vests in the owner the
right to dispose of the soil itself and all things that grow upon
it. Thus, when an individual goes upon the land of another and
removes growing crops, timber, or minerals, the owner has been
legally wronged and the courts must determine the intruder's
liability under applicable law. Although the substantive statu-
tory law of Louisiana is adequate for a just resolution of the
problems that arise in such situations, our courts have unfor-
tunately created rigid jurisprudential rules for measuring the
amount of recovery. The purpose of this Comment is to explore
and to evaluate the actions available to the true owner to re-
cover the economic benefits the interloper has derived from the
land. Attention will be focused primarily on the recovery of
those things classified as non-fruits. At the outset, however, it
is essential to define certain legal distinctions involved in cases
of this nature.
Fruits and Non-Fruits
Traditional civilian analysis of immovbale property involves
a classification of those things derived from or produced by the
immovable estate. In France, these things are categorized as
either fruits or products.1 While Louisiana has never clearly
recognized this distinction,2 for purposes of this Comment the
latter category will be termed non-fruits. Fruits are those things
which are born and re-born of the soil and which do not deplete
the substance of the land.3 Non-fruits, or products, are those
things which deplete the substance of the land when they are
severed or removed and which do not replenish themselves or
only do so very slowly. Timber and minerals, including reve-
nues therefrom such as royalties, delay rentals and bonuses, are
thus non-fruits and are considered component parts of the im-
movable estate.4
1. 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS § 206 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1966);
1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE no. 2297 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
2. 2 A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW TREATISE § 20 (1966).
3. LA. CIv. CODE art. 499; 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE no. 2296 (La. St. L.
Inst. transl. 1959); Harang v. Bowie Lumber Co., 145 La. 96, 81 So. 769 (1919);
Elder v. Ellerbe, 135 La. 990, 66 So. 337 (1914).




Most modern legal systems recognize that some usurpers of
property rights are more culpable than others. Consequently, in-
terlopers have generally been categorized either as trespassers
or possessors, a distinction which has been generally recognized
in Louisiana. 5 However, when considering the accountability for
profits to the owner, our courts have in some cases ignored
the distinction. The possessor category may be further 'divided
into possessors in good or bad faith. A possessor in good faith
is one who possesses under title translative of ownership, has
just reason to believe himself the master of the thing, and is
unaware of any defect in his title.6 A possessor in bad faith is
"he who possesses as master, but assumes that quality when he
well knows that he has no title or that his title is vicious and de-
fective." Thus, all possessors, whether in good or bad faith, pos-
sess as master. This common quality separates the possessor from
the mere trespasser who makes no claim to ownership of the
immovable property. In contrast with common law states8 all
possessors in Louisiana whether in good or bad faith are ac-
corded certain privileges not given to the mere trespasser.9
5. The court recognized this in Davis v. Moore, 156 La. 488, 100 So. 691
(1924). There they concluded that arts. 3451-3453 relative to good faith pos-
sessors are only applicable where questions of title to the thing are in
dispute. See also Falgoust v. Inness, 163 So. 429 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1935);
Alexius v. Oertling, 13 Orl. App. 216 (La. App. 1916); Comment, 28 LA. L. REV.
584, 606 (1968).
6. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 503, 3451.
7. Id. art. 3452.
8. Adverse possession which culminates in perfecting title by acquisitive
prescription is recognized. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 15.1-15.4 (1954).
However, the right of one wrongfully in possession of land to retain the
fruits of his labor is not dependent on his status, but on the time when the
fruits are gathered. The majority rule in America is that any person wrong-
fully in possession of land is privileged to retain the crops he produces if
harvested prior to his eviction. If he is evicted before the crops are harvested,
they belong to the true owner. Id. § 19.16.
9. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3453: "The rights, which are peculiar to the posses-
sor in good faith, are:
"1. The right which such a possessor has to gather for his benefit the
fruits of the thing, until it is claimed by the owner, without being bound
to account for them, except from the time of the claim for restitution.
"2. The right which such a possessor has, in case of eviction from the
thing reclaimed, to retain it until he is reimbursed the expenses he may
have incurred on it."
Id. art. 3454: "Rights, which are common to all possessors in good or
bad faith, are:
"1. That they are considered provisionally as owners of the thing which
they possess, so long as it is not reclaimed by the true owner or person
entitled to reclaim it, and, even after such reclamation, until the right of
the person making it is established.
"2. That every person who has possessed an estate for a year, or
618 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31
Legislative Provisions
The Louisiana Civil Code provides that fruits produced by
a thing belong to its owner, although they may have been pro-
duced by a third person, upon the owner's reimbursing such
person for his expenses.'0 An exception to this general rule is
established in articles 50211 and 345312 which provide that the
good faith possessor is not obligated to restore the fruits. There-
fore, it would appear that the third person who is required to
return the fruits is either the bad faith possessor or the tres-
passer. 18 It is equally apparent that these articles apply only to
fruits.1 4 Although article 502 uses the word "products," it seems
that as used in this article this word is synonymous with fruits
and no distinction was intended.1
5
It is only where fruits are involved that the distinction be-
enjoys peaceably and without interruption a real right, and is disturbed In
it, has an action against the disturber, either to be maintained In his pos-
session, or to be restored to it, in case of eviction, whether by force or
otherwise.
"3. That such a possessor may, by prescription, acquire the property
of the thing which he thus possesses, after a certain time, which is estab-
lished by law according as he has possessed in good or bad faith."
See Note, 8 TUL. L. REV. 596 (1934) for a discussion of the historical
development of the concept of a good faith possessor as a civil law creation
derived from Roman law.
10. LA. CIr. CODE art. 501.
11. "The products of the thing do not belong to the simple possessor,
and must be returned with the thing to the owner who claims the same,
unless the possessor held it bona fide."
12. See note 9 supra.
13. 2 A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW TREATISE § 20 (1966); Comment, 15
TUL. L. REV. 291 (1941).
14. 2 A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW TREATISE § 20 (1966). In discussing
articles 549 and 550 of the French Civil Code, which correspond to articles
502 and 503 of the Louisiana Civil Code, Planiol said, "The following rules
deal solely with the acquisition of fruits. As regards products, which are
not fruits (cuttings of wood from forest trees not regulated, substances
taken out of quarries that are not worked etc.) the possessor never has
a right to them. The owner may always insist upon restitution." 1 PLANIOL,
CIVIL LAw TREATISE no. 2297, at 355 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959); see 2 AuBRY
ET RAu, DROIT CIVIL FFANgAIS § 206, at 273 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1966): "But
he [the good faith possessor] does not acquire the title to the yield which
does not have the character of profits. Despite his good faith, he must resti-
tute the yield of extraordinary lumber cuts (that means those made beyond
the regular forest management); those of mines, surface mining or turfing
operations, or quarries, which were not open at the time he entered into
possession. .. "
15. See 2 A. YIANwoPOULOS, CIVIL LAw TREATISE § 20 (1966); see also Harang
v. Bowie Lumber Co., 145 La. 96, 114, 81 So. 769, 775 (1919), where the court
said, "[bletween the alternatives, therefore, of having to give the word 'fruits'
the broad and comprehensive meaning of all kinds of products of land, or
give the word 'products' the restricted meaning of fruits, properly so called,
we adopt the latter."
COMMENTS
tween good or bad faith, or between possessors and trespassers
becomes material. An action to recover for non-fruits is governed
by the general articles on revendication. 16 Where the recovery
sought is not for fruits, no preferred status is accorded the posi
sessor.17 Therefore, any protection extended to a possessor or
trespasser when recovery for non-fruits is sought is a creation
of the jurisprudence and not the legislature.
The above rules are matters within the ambit of the law of
property. They are concerned with the owner's right to reclaim
his property in the hands of another. Where the issue is damage
to the property, completely different considerations are involved.
In such cases the landowner is not seeking to recover his prop-
erty but only compensation for the loss in value it has suffered.
Thus, the good or bad faith of the other party is immaterial
and the real inquiry is whether the damage occurred through
the fault of the defendant.' 8
Jurisprudence
As mentioned earlier, this Comment is limited primarily to
examining the recovery allowed for those things classified as
non-fruits. This examination will be made of the jurisprudence
in two sections-one concerning timber and the other dealing
with minerals and the removal of the soil itself. The land-
owner's right to recover for fruits will be discussed only briefly
in order to establish a frame of reference with which to compare
the jurisprudence on non-fruits.
16. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 488-98, 525, 531; LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 3651, 3655.
17. 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE no. 2298 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
Planiol explains this by pointing out that the landowner is not hurt when
the good faith possessor has harvested and consumed those recurring things
that have not diminished the substance of the immovable. The landowner
neglected to use the immovable and when he recovers it he has been put
back in his original condition. To allow him to also claim all fruits would
unjustly enrich him at the expense of the good faith possessor. Where
products are involved the landowner is not recovering his property in its
original condition. The substance has been decreased and he is sustaining a
loss unless he can recover the part of the immovable that was severed.
18. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315. "Every act whatever of man that causes
damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it." See
Planiol's discussion of the general theory of fault in the civil law beginning
at 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE no. 863 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959). In
discussing French Civil Code article 1382 (LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315) Planiol
states: "The idea of fault includes all, it is the unjustified injury which
gives rise to the obligation to indemnify; it matters little in what manner
the injury was caused." 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE no. 827, at 443 (La.
St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
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Recovery for the Production of Fruits
For the most part, Louisiana courts have applied the pro-
visions of the Civil Code when the landowner has sought to
recover for those things properly classified as fruits. Thus, the
possessor in good faith is required to return the fruits only from
the time judicial demand is made by the true owner.19 Where
general rents and revenues are involved, however, the courts
have not specified whether the amount recoverable after judicial
demand is to be based upon gross or net revenues.2  The bad
faith possessor, on the other hand, must account to the landowner
for all the fruits but may claim credit for the expenses of pro-
duction.21 The obligation of the possessor in bad faith, then,
is generally measured by the amount of profit that he has made
from the overall transaction.2 2 The measure of recovery, how-
ever, is not always based upon actual production. Where the
possessor neglects to utilize the land efficiently, recovery may
be based upon the production he could have made through the
exercise of ordinary care 23 or the fair rental value of the land.
2 4
19. Roussel v. Railways Realty Co., 165 La. 536, 115 So. 742 (1928); Moore
v. Pitre, 149 La. 910, 90 So. 252 (1921); Delouche v. Rosenthal, 143 La. 581,
78 So. 970 (1918); Blair v. Dwyer, 110 La. 332, 34 So. 464 (1903); Adkins v.
Cason, 170 So. 366 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936).
20. In Roussel v. Railways Realty Co., 165 La. 536, 115 So. 742 (1928) the
court simply stated that after judicial demand the possessor was responsible
for "rents and revenues." In Adkins v. Cason, 170 So. 366 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1936) the case was remanded for the sole purpose of ordering the defendant
to account to plaintiff for "any and all revenues" received after demand for
restitution. It seems logical that this should include only net revenues. Ac-
cording to article 503 of the Civil Code the possessor ceases to be a bona
fide possessor from the time a suit is instituted so he should then be treated
the same as a bad faith possessor.
21. In Lawrence v. Young, 144 La. 1, 80 So. 18 (1918) the court expressly
disallowed a claim for expenses made by a bad faith possessor on the
ground that the expenses had not been proved. The court then expressly
reserved an opinion as to whether she would have been entitled to the ex-
penses if proved. This seems to be the only case where the propriety of the
bad faith possessor's recovery of expenses was questioned.
22. Curran v. Jones, 163 La. 579, 112 So. 492 (1927); Rosenthal-Brown
Fur Co. v. Jones-Frere Fur Co., 162 La. 403, 110 So. 630 (1926).
23. Winter v. Zacharie, 6 Rob. 466 (La. 1844).
24. In Provost v. Romero, 177 So. 375, 377 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1937) the
court stated: "But the possessor of land who holds it in bad faith is required
to restore the fruits or pay for the use of the land," (Emphasis added.) In
Brown v. Tauzin, 185 La. 86, 168 So. 502 (1936) the possessor was in bad
faith and recovery was computed at the fair rental value of the land that
had been under cultivation, with no attempt to show the actual production.
See also Harang v. Gheens Realty Co., 155 La. 68, 96, 98 So. 760, 769 (1923).
The court held that the owners were entitled to recover from a bad faith
possessor the fair rental value, saying: "It is not important in determining
the question here presented whether defendant so managed the property as
to have derived but little or no revenue from it. The fact remains that during
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Recovery for Production of Non-Fruits
Timber
According to the Louisiana jurisprudence, the amount re-
coverable for the wrongful removal of timber depends upon the
classification of the person who cuts it.2- He may be in good
faith,26 in legal bad faith but moral good faith,27 or in legal and
moral bad faith. 28 If he is in good faith the landowner can re-
cover only the stumpage value of the timber, that is, its value
in place. In other words, he is subject to the same obligation
as the possessor in bad faith who gathers fruits. 29 If the timber
remover is in legal bad faith but moral good faith, the land-
owner can recover the value of the timber when sold by the
wrongdoer less the actual production expenses incurred. If the
that period plaintiffs were illegally deprived of their property, and should
not be permitted to suffer because of the manner in which defendants may
have managed or used it, but, under the circumstances, are entitled to its
fair rental value."
25. Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States, 106 U.S. 432 (1882); Motichek v.
Perriloux, 231 La. 849, 93 So.2d 190 (1957); Blanchard v. Normand-Breaux
Lumber Co., 220 La. 633, 57 So.2d 211 (1952); Quatre Parish Co. v. Beaure-
gard Parish School Ed., 220 La. 592, 57 So.2d 197 (1952); Kennedy v. Perry
Timber Co., 219 La. 264, 52 So.2d 847 (1951); Culpepper v. Weaver Bros. Lum-
ber Corp., 194 La. 897, 195 So. 349 (1940); Coignet v. Louisiana Cypress Lumber
Co., 177 La. 1023, 150 So. 7 (1933); Ward v. Hayes-Ewell Co., 155 La. 15, 98
So. 740 (1923); Martin v. Louisiana Cent. Lumber Co., 150 La. 157, 90 So. 553(1920); Interstate Trust & Banking Co. v. Picard & Geismar, 147 La. 430,
85 So. 65 (1920); Ducros v. St. Bernard Cypress Co., 145 La. 691, 82 So. 841
(1918); Allen v. Frank Janes Co., 142 La. 1056, 78 So. 115 (1918); Tensas
Delta Land Co. v. Fleischer, 132 La. 1021, 62 So. 129 (1912); State v. F. B.
Williams Cypress Co., 131 La. 62, 58 So. 1033 (1912); St. Paul v. Louisiana
Cypress Lumber Co., 116 La. 585, 40 So. 906 (1906); Guarantee Trust & Safe
Deposit Co. v. E. C. Drew Inv. Co., 107 La. 251, 31 So. 736 (1902); Gillian v.
Jones, 157 So.2d 598 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963); Havard v. Luttrell, 68 So.2d 798
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1953); Sentell v. Warmsley, 157 So. 152 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1934); Ray v. Normand, 2 La. App. 310 (2d Cir. 1925).
26. This means that he believed the timber or land was his and had
just reason for believing so. Guarantee Trust & Safe Deposit Co. .v. E. C.
Drew Inv. Co., 107 La. 251, 31 So. 736 (1902).
27. This means that he did believe the timber was his but should have
known from external evidence available that it was not. State v. F. B.
Williams Cypress Co., 131 La. 62, 58 So. 1033 (1912).
28. This means that he knew the timber did not belong to him but
cut it anyway or cut it with reckless disregard for whether it belonged to
him or not. Terry v. Butler, 240 La. 398, 123 So.2d 865 (1960).
29. See 2 A. YIANNOPOULOS, CiviL LAW TREATISE 418 n.239 (1966). In actual
practice such a concise statement as this seems questionable. Compare, for
instance, the court's statement in Harang v. Gheens Realty quoted in note
24 supra with the statement in Melton v. Gross & Janes quoted in note 49
infra. The formula for determining liability is the same, but in the case
of fruits the landowner's protection is greater because the possessor can
be charged with what should have been produced whereas in non-fruits,
particularly timber, the possessor or trespasser is only charged for actual
production.
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timber remover is in legal and moral bad faith, the landowner
can recover the value of the timber when sold and the remover
may not claim the costs of production.30
The origin of the distinction between legal and moral bad
faith is unclear. No basis exists for the distinction in the Louisi-
ana Civil Code8' nor does such a distinction exist in French
law. 2 Although this classification has been viewed as an en-
croachment of the common law upon Louisiana's civil law33
and it is even said to have been wholly "drawn from common
law sources, '3 4 this is not the case. 8 The distinction originated
through a curious merger of the civil law principles applicable
to good and bad faith possessors on the one hand and common
law principles of damage for trespass on the other.
The early cases dealing with good and bad faith possession
for purposes of acquisitive prescription and the right to retain
fruits and revenues3 delineated only two classes of possession-
good faith and bad faith. In an effort to explain what consti-
tuted bad faith, however, the court in several cases held that
one who possessed under some legal defect-i.e., some error of
law-must be charged with constructive knowledge of the de-
fect. While no moral turpitude was ascribed to the possessor's
actions, he was legally considered to be a possessor in bad faith.87
30. There is a concise statement of these rules in Kennedy v. Perry
Timber Co., 219 La. 264, 52 So.2d 847 (1951).
31. Note, 5 TUL. L. REV. 117 (1930). Regardless of the elements con-
stituting good or bad faith possession, it is obvious that the idea of good
faith being opposed by two classes of bad faith has no sanction in the Civil
Code.
32. See 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE nos. 2667-2669, 2290-2301, 2725-29 (La.
St. L. Inst. transl. 1959); see also 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS §§ 206,
218, sub. I 311-12 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1966).
33. Note, 5 TUL. L. REV. 117, 118 (1930).
34. Gray v. State, Department of Highways, 191 So.2d 802, 811 n.4 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1966).
35. The majority rule in common law seems to be that the trespass is
either intentional or innocent with the question of his justifiable belief in
a legal right to enter the land determinative of his status. In effect, a third
category is created in most jurisdictions by allowing the court wide discre-
tion to assess punitive damages if the trespasser's actions are willful or
reckless. The willfulness or recklessness Is treated as simply an extreme
category of intentional trespass. 4-A AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §§ 28.14-16
(1954); 87 C.J.S. Trespass § 121 (1954); 52 Am. JUR.2d Loss and Timber §§ 126,
129, 135 (1970).
36. Vicksburg, S. & P. R.R. v. Elmore, 46 La. Ann. 1237, 15 So. 701
(1894); Montgomery v. Whitfield, 41 La. Ann. 649, 6 So. 224 (1889); Heirs
of Dohan v. Murdock, 41 La. Ann. 494, 6 So. 131 (1889).
37. An example of one explanation that is typical is found in McDade v.
Bossier Levee Bd., 109 La. 627, 636, 33 So. 628, 632 (1902), where the court
said: "Coming to the matter of the settlement of accounts between the
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These early cases did not establish the triple classification system
currently in use; the possessor was considered as being in good
or bad faith only.
The development of legal and moral bad faith as separate
concepts can be traced directly to the early timber cases. In
Eastman v. Harris8 the court rendered judgment against the
defendant for the value of the goods he had converted, allowing
the cost of conversion as a deduction. The court said of the de-
fendant: "Whatever in a mere moral point of view may be de-
fendant's freedom from blame, it is clear that in a legal aspect he
was a possessor in bad faith."8 9
In 1882, the United States Supreme Court decided Bolles
Wooden Ware Co. v. United States.40 This case, unrelated to
Louisiana property law, was concerned with the unauthorized
removal of timber from public land in Wisconsin. Relying on
several English cases involving trespass to mining properties,
the court allowed the landowner to recover the value of the
timber when sold by the willful trespasser. The rationale of
Bolles Wooden Ware Co.41 was incorporated into Louisiana's
jurisprudence in Guaranty Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. E. C.
litigants for improvements on the one part, and rents and revenues, on
the other, we have to hold that, legally speaking, plaintiff has been a
possessor in bad faith; and this we regret, for we are satisfied that morally
he was in good faith." Further on in the opinion the court said: "His error
was one of law and not of fact. Applying the law to this situation, the
possession of plaintiff was in legal bad faith." (Emphasis added.) Id. The
defendant had purchased, in good faith, from the levee board in contra-
vention of a law prohibiting the levee board from selling.
This view was later repudiated by the courts after much discussion about
the effects of an error of fact. See Delouche v. Rosenthal, 143 La. 581, 585-
86, 78 So. 970, 972 (1918) where the court stated: "If the maxim, 'Ignorantia
legis non excusat,' applies to a possessor who has bought the property fairly,
for an adequate consideration and in ignorance of any fact affecting the
validity of his title, we can never say that a defendant in a petitory action
was a possessor in good faith if we declare his title invalid .... Having just
reason to believe does not mean having a reason supported by law."
38. 4 La. Ann. 193 (1849).
39. Id. at 195. This characterization of the defendant was not necessary
to the decision in this case. The plaintiff's raft of logs had run aground on
defendant's land while being floated down the river. Defendant cut them
up and sold them for fuel wood. So, actually the court was dealing with
movable property that had been appropriated by a non-owner, changed in
form and sold. The court correctly applied La. Civ. Code arts. 517-518, 524,
2292, 3384, 3387 (1825), which are presently LA. Cv. CODE arts. 525-526, 532,
2314, 3421, 3424.
40. 106 U.S. 432 (1882).
41. This case was based on the common law actions of trover and con-
version; therefore, it was not appropriate authority for either recovery in tort
or revendication of property under the Louisiana Civil Code.
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Drew Investment Co. 42 In this case defendant Maguire pur-
chased certain timber from the defendant E. C. Drew Investment
Co. The location of the timber was revealed to him by an agent
of the company based on a map the agent had. Later, it was
discovered that the map was in error and Maguire had cut
timber belonging to the plaintiff. Maguire and Drew Investment
Co., along with all the partners, were joined as defendants and
found liable in solido as joint tortfeasors. As Maguire was in
good faith, his liability for wrongful removal of the timber was
limited to the stumpage value. The members of the Drew In-
vestment Co., however, were found to be in bad faith, and their
liability was computed at the price they received for the timber
with no deductions allowed for the costs of production. In this
case the court was unconcerned with categorizing defendants as
good or bad faith possessors of land. The case was simply one
of trespass and wrongful damage to land. Had Drew Investment
Co. attempted to prove their good faith under standards estab-
lished by the Civil Code for good faith possession they would
have failed because they had no title at all. It is not clear what
standard the court used in determining bad faith. But since the
only authority cited by the court was Bolles Wooden Ware Co.,
it would appear that the defendant was viewed as a willful tres-
passer. Thus Drew's bad faith was assimilated to the obvious
moral turpitude involved in the cited case.
In State v. F. B. Williams Cypress Co.43 the Supreme Court
of Louisiana reviewed the above jurisprudence and determined
that it established the following principles: (1) where one has
been in bad faith (presumably meaning legal bad faith) the
proper measure of recovery for converted property is the value
after conversion less expenses of conversion; (2) where "the
defendants have been found to have converted the property of
others in bad faith, moral as well as legal, they have been con-
demned for the value of the property, in its changed condition,
with no deduction whatever of the cost incurred in making the
change."44 The court then concluded that in the instant case,
"the ends of justice are subserved by holding that the owner is
entitled to the profit resulting from the change made in the
form or condition of the property by the possessor in legal bad
42. 107 La. 251, 31 So. 736 (1902).
43. 131 La. 62, 58 So. 1033 (1912).
44. Id. at 70, 58 So. at 1036.
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faith, and that the latter cannot reasonably expect anything
more than the re-imbursement of the expenses incurred in mak-
ing the change."45
Since Williams Cypress Co. the jurisprudence has remained
consistent, and the triple classification seems firmly established
in Louisiana whether ownership of the property is at issue or
defendant has merely gone upon plaintiff's land and removed
timber without claiming ownership. 4 Consequently, even though
the action is brought in tort under Louisiana Civil Code article
2315, the same standard of recovery will apply. The classifica-
tions of good faith, legal bad faith, and moral bad faith make the
quantum of recovery depend on the degree of culpability of the
wrongdoer and not on the amount of harm suffered. Adherence
to such a system results in awarding punitive damages to the
landowner in some cases, while in others inadequate compen-
sation is received. The latter situation is well illustrated in
Terry v. Butler47 where the defendants cut and sold immature
pine trees for pulpwood. The owner attempted to recover the
value of the trees in their more valuable mature state.48 Al-
though the defendants were in moral and legal bad faith, recov-
ery was limited to the value of the pulpwood. As properly
pointed out by dissenting Justice Hawthorne, such an inflexible
rule places the landowner at the mercy of the wrongdoer. If that
wrongdoer cuts, processes, and sells valuable timber as an in-
ferior product, the landowner is unjustly deprived of the highest
economic utilization of his property completely against his will.49
45. Id. at 70-71, 58 So. at 1036.
46. Blanchard v. Norman-Breaux Lumber Co., 220 La. 633, 57 So.2d 211
(1952); Quatre Parish Co. v. Beauregard Parish School Bd., 220 La. 592,
57 So.2d 197 (1952); Kennedy v. Perry Timber Co., 219 La. 264, 52 So.2d
847 (1951); Ward v. Hayes-Ewell Lumber Co., 155 La. 15, 98 So. 740 (1923);
Melton v. Gross & Janes Co., 46 So.2d 918 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950); Allen v.
Frank Janes Co., 142 La. 1056, 78 So. 115 (1918); Sentell v. Warmsley, 157 So.
152 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934).
47. 240 La. 398, 123 So.2d 865 (1960).
48. The owner advanced an alternate claim for the value of the timber
as "lap pulp" which was after processing by the paper mill and equivalent
to the value of the trees in their mature state. The court said the value
to be used was not the ultimate manufactured value but the value at which
the trespasser sold It.
49. This was the case in Melton v. Gross & Janes Co., 46 So.2d 918
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1950). The defendant had cut oak trees from plaintiff's
land and manufactured them into railroad crossties. The court found that
defendant was in legal bad faith and assessed damages at the manufactured
price of the finished product less the cost of manufacture. Plaintiff intro-
duced evidence to show that if the trees had been manufactured into oak
flooring the manufactured value would have been approximately three times
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Although the majority of cases compute damages by either
deducting expenses from the value at which the timber was sold
or not, according to the degree of bad faith of the remover, some
cases indicate that other factors should be considered and other
items of damages allowed. Thus, while an award for diminution
in the value of the remaining timber has been allowed,5o it has
been held that no recovery can be had for the humiliation, grief,
and worry resulting from the unauthorized removal of timber. 51
Claims for damages resulting from negligence in felling and
removing trees,r2 diminution in value of the property, and loss
of aesthetic value" have been denied because proof of the
items was speculative. Moreover, it has not been determined
whether they constitute legitimate items of damage. It has been
held that the plaintiff's desire that the character of his land not
be changed from woodland to open land is not a valid basis
for recovery.5
Two cases, in particular, indicate dissatisfaction with mea-
suring recovery according to the degree of culpability of the
wrongdoer and not on the amount of harm suffered. In Anders
v. Tremont Lumber Co. 5 plaintiff recovered for damage suffered
by young trees in a fire caused by the defendant's train while
hauling out timber that had been wrongfully removed. The
result is commendable. The landowner was fully compensated
not only for the value of the timber removed but for the addi-
tional damage done to his property through the wrongdoer's
negligence. In a second, very recent, case the court awarded
defendants five hundred dollars as damages for the trespass
their value when manufactured into railroad ties. The court rejected this
argument, stating: "The testimony introduced by plaintiff that the manu-
factured value of flooring that could have been made from the trees wrong-
fully cut has no force in setting the amount of his claim, inasmuch as plain-
tiff's right to the value above that of stumpage . .. is under that portion
of the Article [article 525] which gives him the right "to claim the thing
which was made out of' his materials." Id. at 919-20.
50. Green v. Delafleld, 121 So. 339 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1929).
51. Anders v. Tremont Lumber Co., 171 La. 1, 129 So. 649 (1930); Foster
v. Beard, 221 So.2d 319 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
52. Quatre Parish Co. v. Beauregard Parish School Bd., 220 La. 592, 57
So.2d 197 (1952).
53. Foster v. Beard, 221 So.2d 319 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
54. Id. See also Livaudais v. Williams Lumber Co., 34 So.2d 292 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1948), where the plaintiff was allowed damages for a fence
the defendants had torn down in addition to recovery of the manufactured
price of the timber removed. An award for damages to young trees was
not allowed because there was insufficient proof.
55. 171 La. 1, 129 So. 649 (1930).
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committed by the defendants."' The award was for "nonpecu-
niary damage" and was in addition to the manufactured value
of the timber even though the timber had not been sold by the
defendants but had been allowed to rot.
Minerals and Dirt
As mineral law in Louisiana is not expressly provided for
in the Civil Code and has been developed primarily by the
courts, it is not surprising that it accords generally with the
law prevailing in our sister states. The general common law
rule is that the landowner can recover the value of the oil or
gas when brought to the surface and placed in the pipeline or
storage tank. The unauthorized producer is allowed to deduct
for drilling and production expenses if the taking was innocent,
that is, in good faith; but there is no deduction if the taking was
willful or in bad faith. 7 Some difficulty has been experienced
in defining good and bad faith. Generally, a justifiable belief
in one's title is enough to constitute good faith. Having no title
or no justifiable reason for believing in the validity of one's title
constitutes bad faith.58 A minority common law view, however,
is illustrated in Pittsburg & West Virginia Gas Co. v. Pentress
Gas Co.59 where the defendant, justifiably believing in his own
title, continued to produce gas after plaintiff had informed him
of his claim. The Supreme Court of West Virginia held that the
knowledge of an opposing title put defendant on notice as to
possible defects in his title and placed him in legal bad faith.
This holding has been criticized as unsound by the American Law
of Property.60
In Louisiana in suits for recovery for the unauthorized
production of oil and gas and for removal of dirt, the courts
have relied heavily on the timber cases. 61 It was recognized at
an early date that minerals, like timber, could not be properly
56. Knoll v. Delta Development Co., 218 So.2d 109, 112 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 253 La. 880, 220 So.2d 460 (1969).
57. See 2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 10.9 (1954) and cases collected at
528 nn.3, 4.
58. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 10.9 (1954) and cases collected at 531
n.19 distinguishing between good and bad faith.
59. 84 W. Va. 449, 100 S.E. 296 (1919).
60. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 10.9, at 531 (1954).
61. See Comment, 15 TUL. L. REv. 291 (1941) for a discussion of the
measure of damages allowed for unauthorized production of oil and gas.
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classified as fruits.0 2 There was the additional problem of de-
termining whether a mineral lessee could be given the status of
a possessor since he did not claim ownership of the property."
Despite the apparent inconsistency, the courts considered the
mineral lessee a possessor in order to afford him some protection
when he was in moral good faith.6 4 As in the timber cases, the
mineral lessee who is in legal bad faith but in moral good faith
is under the same obligation as the possessor in bad faith who
gathers fruits. He must restore the value of the minerals taken
but is allowed to deduct the expenses of production.,
Louisiana courts have exhibited more flexibility in mea-
suring damages for the removal of dirt than for the removal of
timber or minerals. This flexibility can be attributed to the fact
that most of these cases have been presented to the court as
actions based on tort law and the emphasis has been on com-
pensating the landowner for his loss. The question of the own-
ership of the land was not usually at issue.26 Among the various
methods which have been utilized for determining the award
for wrongful removal of dirt are the cost necessary to replace
the dirt,6 7 the cost of restoring the property to its original con-
62. Harang v. Bowie Lumber Co., 145 La. 96, 81 So. 769 (1919); Elder v.
Ellerbe, 135 La. 990, 66 So. 337 (1914).
63. In Vance v. Sentell, 178 La. 749, 152 So. 513 (1933), it was held that
the only bona fide possessor was one who held under a title translative of
ownership.
64. The courts had simply applied the timber cases to the mineral cases
by analogy. In Cooke v. Gulf Refining So., 135 La. 609, 65 So. 758 (1914),
the court cited as authority Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States, 106 U.S. 432
(1882); Ball & Bro. Lumber Co. v. Simms Lumber Co., 121 La. 627, 46 So.
674 (1908); Guarantee Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. E. C. Drew Inv. Co.,
107 La. 251, 31 So. 736 (1902).
65. Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545 (1923); Martel v. Hunt, 195
La. 701, 197 So. 402 (1940); Cooke v. Gulf Refining Co., 135 La. 609, 65 So.
758 (1914).
66. Gallo v. Sorci, 221 So.2d 570 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969); Woods v. Slocum,
179 So.2d 464 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965); East v. Pan American Petroleum
Corp., 168 So.2d 426 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964); Joseph v. Netherton Co., 136
So.2d 556 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962). Where the issue of ownership was present
the question of good or bad faith appears in the cases. DeHart v. Conti-
nental Land & Fur Co., 205 La. 569, 17 So.2d 827 (1944); Amite Gravel &
Sand Co. v. Roseland Gravel Co., 148 La. 704, 87 So. 718 (1921). This same
principle was followed where removal of salt was involved. State v. Jefferson
Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304, 163 So. 145 (1935). But in an early
petitory action with a claim for recovery for dirt sold the court very properly
awarded the value of the dirt removed without concerning itself with the
good or bad faith of the possessor. Caillier v. Profito, 171 La. 693, 131 So.
851 (1931).
67. Woods v. Slocum, 179 So.2d 464 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
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dition,68 and the market value of the dirt removed. 69 These
cases emphasize the importance of determining the landowner's
loss and compensating him for that loss. For example, in Woods
v. Slocum70 the plaintiff's property could have been made suit-
able for commercial development by filling the low areas. He
had, in fact, a mound of dirt on it for that purpose. When the
defendant wrongfully removed the dirt, the court awarded plain-
tiff the cost of replacing it as damages. In Gallo v. Sorci7' sand
had been wrongfully removed from a batture area. The court
held that the measure of recovery was the value of the sand in
place since there was no indication that the damage to the prop-
erty had rendered it unfit for the purposes for which the plaintiff
intended to use it. In both cases a flexible standard measured
recovery. That standard was the use prospects of the land and
the intentions of the owner. While such flexible standards have
been adopted for the most part, there are a number of cases
involving dirt removal where the measure of recovery centered
around the good or bad faith of the remover in much the same
way as in the timber and oil cases previously cited.7 2
One recent case needs discussion. In Gray v. State, Depart-
ment of Highways73 the department had removed a large quan-
tity of dirt from plaintiff's land thereby creating borrow pits.
The plaintiff claimed the taking was illegal and sought recovery
of an amount sufficient to restore the premises to its original
condition. After reviewing the cases on dirt removal and the
jurisprudential rules developed in the timber cases, Judge Tate
(then serving on the Third Circuit Court of Appeal) reached
what seems to this writer to be a correct result. The depart-
ment was held liable for the value of the dirt taken and for the
damages caused by the taking. The holding was based in large
part on Louisiana Civil Code article 50774 because the department
68. Joseph v. Netherton Co., 136 So.2d 556 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
69. East v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 168 So.2d 426 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1964).
70. 179 So. 2d 464 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
71. 221 So.2d 570 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
72. DeHart v. Continental Land & Fur Co., 205 La. 569, 17 So.2d 827
(1944); Amite Gravel & Sand Co. v. Roseland Gravel Co., 148 La. 704, 87
So. 718 (1921); Derbofen v. T. L. James & Co., 148 So.2d 795 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1962), rehearing denied, Feb. 4, 1963.
73. 191 So.2d 802 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966), mod4fted, 250 La. 1045, 202 So.2d
24 (1967).
74. LA. CIV. CODE art. 507 provides: "If the owner of the soil has made
constructions, plantations and works thereon, with materials which did not
belong to him, he has a right to keep the same, whether he has made
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had used the plaintiff's materials for construction on its land.
The value of the dirt was determined as of the time it was
converted into materials for use in the highway minus the costs
of conversion. Although the court concluded that the depart-
ment was at least in legal bad faith, the concept of legal bad
faith was not at all necessary to the decision. The result reached
is supported by either article 507 or 5 3 1 h of the Civil Code,
neither of which are concerned with good or bad faith but with
the right of an owner to recover his property or its value. On
appeal the supreme court did not consider the validity of Judge
Tate's analysis but reversed on other grounds."e This liberal
approach seems highly desirable in the types of cases under con-
sideration because it affords the court a degree of flexibility
which enables it to fully compensate the landowner for his loss.77
Conclusion
As noted above the cases dealing with soil removal have
exhibited more flexibility than either the mineral or timber
cases. The greatest inequities seem to exist in the timber re-
moval cases. These inequities are perpetuated because of two
standards used by the courts. These are: (1) basing the recovery
on the price actually received for the timber, and (2) basing
allowance for expenses on the degree of culpability of the in-
truder. This makes it possible for two landowners to lose timber
in identical amount and quality, yet receive substantially differ-
ent recoveries. If one intruder on land sold the timber he re-
use of them in good or bad faith, on condition of reimbursing their value
to the owner of them and paying damages, if he has thereby caused him
any Injury or damage."
75. Id. art. 531 provides: "In all cases where the proprietor, whose
materials have been employed unknown to him In making a thing of
another kind, has a right to claim the property of that thing, he is at liberty
to demand either that the materials be returned to him in the same species,
quantity, weight, measure and quality, or that their value be paid."
76. Gray v. State, Department of Highways, 250 La. 1045, 202 So.2d 45
(1967).
77. Article 507 is particularly applicable in the Gray case because the
department used rather than sold the earth. The article requires both pay-
ment for the materials used and compensation for any damage caused. In
a case where the materials were sold the court should apply article 531,
which provides for payment of value rather than return of the property when
demanded by the owner. Since there is no provision in that article for addi-
tional payment for damages, recovery could then be had under article 2315
for any additional harm suffered.
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moved for its maximum value while the other intruder sold
his as a product of lesser value, the second landowner would be
deprived of his property without being fully compensated. The
same result would obtain if both intruders sold the timber for
its maximum value but the second was in good faith while the
first was in moral and legal bad faith. The second landowner's
recovery would be decreased by the costs of production, thus
not affording him complete compensation. It is suggested that
a more equitable result would follow in all cases if the courts
would first classify the economic benefits as either fruits or non-
fruits. Where fruits are involved the courts should follow the
statutory authority and jurisprudence outlined earlier. The
good faith possessor would retain all fruits produced prior to
judicial demand, and the bad faith possessor would be obligated
to restore all fruits after deducting his production costs. In addi-
tion, the landowner should have a right to recover any other
damages he could prove based on the delictual responsibility of
the "third party." This aspect of the case would be governed by
the usual rules in any tort action. Under this analysis it would
be possible to require a good faith possessor, who had no re-
sponsibility to restore fruits, to repair any damage caused by
his fault.
In cases where the economic benefits derived are properly
classified as non-fruits, the code articles dealing with good or bad
faith would not be applicable. As non-fruits are a part of the
substance of the property, they are not governed by the code
articles dealing with the landowner's right to fruits, but by the
articles dealing with any owner's right to revendicate his prop-
erty in the hands of another. If, after exercising his rights
under these articles to reclaim his property, the landowner is
still left in a damaged financial condition he should be able to
obtain relief under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315. In either
case the landowner's action against the wrongdoer would encom-
pass two distinct theories of recovery. One would be based on
property law-the landowner's right to recover his property or
the benefits it produces. The other would be a delictual action-
the right of anyone to recover from the one whose fault caused
him harm.
Donald R. Sharp
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